A MINUTEMAN III ICBM lighting up the night sky. Source: Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (https://www.afnwc.af.mil/Weapon-Systems/Minuteman-III-LGM-30G/)
If you were told you had $600B through 2030 to spend on anything you would like— would you spend the money on something you may never use? That is exactly what the US is undertaking regarding its strategic forces. So, why then, are we spending all this money to modernize our nukes?
Good question. To begin, the primary reason is to ensure deterrence. Which is to say, communicating clear, actionable, and credible expectations to either (i) punish or (ii) deny US adversaries the relative benefits associated with a given course of action.
Essentially, deterrence has ensured nuclear peace since August 9th, 1945. In large part, that is why both me and you are here today. Current US strategic forces are aging and have endured substantial life extension programs (LEPs). The shelf life for these delivery systems is limited. It is time for fresh legs.
As the US embarks to substantiate its nuclear deterrent capabilities, all three legs of the US nuclear triad will undergo modernization. The US triad is comprised of strategic bombers (air leg), intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) (ground leg), and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on board 14 Ohio class submarines (sea leg).
Each leg of the triad offers unique strategic benefits. For example, if deployed to sea, SLBMs are highly survivable from a potential adversarial first strike. Today, US submarine technology remains largely undetectable. Conversely, bombers sitting on the tarmac are extremely vulnerable to an adversarial first strike. But, in a crisis, bombers can be dispersed to signal escalation before being recalled. ICBMs are a different story. Once the keys are turned and the missile is in the air, there is little one can do to stop it from striking its target. On the flip side, ICBMs are extremely accurate and have ground penetrating capabilities. The complementary nature of the triad is critical in safeguarding US integrated deterrence.
A B-2 Spirit conducting a refueling operation. Source: Air Force (https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104482/b-2-spirit/)
In addition to modernizing the triad’s delivery systems, the United States Government (USG) tasked the Energy Department (DOE), specifically the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), to update and modernize existing warheads. Most notably, DOE will develop a new warhead (W93) for the Trident D5 LE2 (SLBM). Currently, the SLBM systems carry the W76 and W88 warheads (Note: Stay tuned in the coming weeks for a breakdown of US modernization efforts).
In the next decade, DOE and the Defense Department (DOD) will coordinate to ensure a modernized US deterrent. DOE will ensure warhead resiliency, safety, and functionality. DOD will ensure delivery system resiliency, strategic utility, and functionality in ever-changing threat environments.
For the first time, the US will be facing two near-peer nuclear adversaries (Moscow and Beijing). An emerging multipolar nuclear order will present new and unforeseen obstacles. The US must wade into the unknown with a credible deterrent.
It is noteworthy, US modernization programs are not a response to current increases in Beijing’s nuclear forces (e.g., increases in ICBM silos). The following modernization programs are intended to persist for numerous decades, possibly longer, with the implementation of LEPs.
Next generation systems will necessitate engineering that ensures maximum flexibility. It will be critical for DOD and DOE to ensure resilient systems in the face of consistently developing threats. Strategic acquisition and sustainment, whether delivery vehicles or warheads, must bear this reality in mind.
The aftermath of “Fat Man” in Nagasaki. Source: National WWII Museum and the National Archives (https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/bombing-nagasaki-august-9-1945)
The task is daunting, even for those steeped in the esoteric debates of US nuclear policy. No clear answer is available. But one truth is evident—nuclear deterrence worked. The question then becomes, how do we continue to make it work?
All-out nuclear war will not provide winners and losers. It will provide those who were destroyed and those who survived in a world of nothing.
It is critical for the US to ensure its deterrent capabilities and extended the nuclear peace established in August of 1945.
